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Editorial - Processual Change 
in Taiwan
Actors, Values, and Change
STÉPHANE CORCUFF
Again, a new era in Taiwan
Taiwan in early 2016 experienced a resounding change in political ma-jorities. Not only was Tsai Ing-wen, President of the Democratic Pro-gressive Party (DPP), elected to the presidency of Taiwan (the Republic
of China), but also the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) lost
the majority it had held continuously since 1947 in the legislature. Less than
two years before, in the late 2014 local elections, the KMT had already lost
control of Taiwan’s main local governments and assemblies. Among other
factors, this series of defeats resulted from the marked popular dissatisfac-
tion with the policies of President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) for most of
his two terms in office. Mr. Ma, of the KMT, engaged the island in closer co-
operation with China, which did not produce the economic benefits he had
hoped for in exchange for a conciliatory posture vis-à-vis China, whose ir-
redentism over Taiwan irritates most Taiwanese. (1)
If a new majority in the legislature or a change in executive power can
undoubtedly be considered as changes in themselves, change, as a notion,
can be studied as a complex process going beyond party change and its
most obvious results, the adoption of new laws and new policies. The pro-
cess of change, whether rapid or slow, visible or invisible, sudden or progres-
sive, is often pushed by actors with agendas based on worldviews and
legitimized by values. As Gérard Wormser, a French political and moral
philosopher, recently put it, “An election is the occasion to revise the social
pact.” (2) In this sense, political change should be studied in connection with
the pressure exerted by various organisations structuring civil society
through political institutions in representative democracy: the legislature,
government and administration, the presidency, and sometimes even the
judiciary. 
The January 2016 election, ending in victory for the Taiwan nativist parties
opposed to unification with China, gave the latter an absolute legislative
majority. They wasted no time in ushering in a series of new laws and poli-
cies, some announced before the first meeting of the house in February, and
others detailed by the president in her inauguration speech in May. Among
others, we can notice an official apology to Taiwan’s Aborigines; (3) the launch
of a “New South Policy” (xin xiangnan zhengce) to circumvent economic
dependency on China; (4) the reopening of a policy of transitional justice,
now focusing on the immense ill-gotten wealth acquired by the KMT during
decades of dictatorship; (5) the gradual scrapping of unjustified and costly
benefits granted to civil servants, occupations most often chosen by Tai-
wan’s Mainlanders; (6) the reform of weekly work hours to reduce working
time while enhancing productivity; (7) or the proposal, still under discussion,
of a multi-billion dollar “Forward-looking Infrastructure Development Pro-
gram.” (8)
Civil society and the multiplicity of actors in
democratisation
These efforts to combine social justice, transitional justice, economic dy-
namism, and the unlocking of the island’s geopolitical deadlock have
launched Taiwan on a path of rapid reform. But how do we evaluate such
changes? And what does change mean? The changes briefly described above
1. This special issue originated in two workshops organised in Nottingham and Taipei by the Taiwan
Study Programme of the University of Nottingham and the Taipei branch of CEFC at Academia
Sinica: The Ordinary and Extraordinary in Taiwan and Political, Social and Economic Change in
Taiwan, and in a subsequent call for papers on “Processual change in Taiwan.” The papers were se-
lected and edited by Lee Chun-Yi and myself. I warmly thank my colleague Chun-Yi, together with
colleagues of the editorial board of China Perspectives, for their invaluable help in the long process
of editing a new special issue on Taiwan.
2. “Une élection est l’occasion de réviser le pacte social.” Gérard Wormser, “La grande transformation.
L’élection présidentielle française de 2017” (The great transformation. The French presidential
election in 2017), http://sens-public.org/article1250.html?lang=fr (accessed on 7 May 2017). 
3. Apologies for centuries of acculturation, deprivation of land, and ethno-cultural bias after Formosa
started to be colonised by Han people in the seventeenth century. The Presidential Office an-
nounced by the same token the resumption of mapping, initiated under the previous DPP admin-
istration (of President Chen Shuibian, 2000-2008), of Aboriginal “traditional” territories; it added
explicitly the aim of ultimately reaching a form of devolution of political and administrative power
to Aborigines in those territories. On the adoption of a law regarding the protection of Aboriginal
languages and the challenge it will meet in its application, please see elements of a seminar held
at CEFC Taipei on 26 May 2017: http://www.cefc.com.hk/fr/event/taiwans-policy-regarding-in-
digenous-peoples/.
4. See the article by Lin and Lee in this issue. This dependence is considered a national threat and a
top geopolitical concern. The new policy will foster economic, political, social, and cultural ex-
changes with Southeast Asian nations. On the New South Policy, see the analysis by Bloomberg
Politics: https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-16/taiwan-seeks-stronger-asia-
ties-to-overcome-reliance-on-china (accessed on 17 May 2017).
5. The Taiwan-born, pro-democracy President Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000) directed a smooth transition
from dictatorship to democracy. When initially launching the policy of transitional justice, he fo-
cused essentially on recognising the political crimes of his party (lifting the taboo on the 1947
massacre by the KMT and recognising the victims of the following period of White Terror (see
Stolojan in this issue).
6. It notably targeted the extremely generous pensions given to civil servants (such as teachers, bu-
reaucrats, and military personnel, the so called jun-gong-jiao electoral iron base of the KMT) in a
country where pension funds are threatened with bankruptcy, and the extraordinary 18% interest
rates on their savings, which no other Taiwanese could enjoy.
7. This is supposed to be achieved by reducing some national holidays and protecting employees’
rights to a minimum number of resting days per week, while taking into consideration the con-
siderable variety of situations, depending on the nature of the business.
8. Yet to be voted on by the Legislative Yuan at the time of writing, this policy combining support
to the economy with public spending, development of infrastructure and transportation, mod-
ernisation of the economy, and urban renewal, is projecting expenses of US$ 29.15 billion (€ 26
billion) over eight years.
are seen only through what may appear, at first glance, to be their main
political and administrative actors: the presidency, the administration, and
the legislature. Such is the view of institutionalism, and this type of analysis
forgets what is perhaps the biggest part of the picture: the multitude of ac-
tors within the state apparatus, next to it, and engaged in cooperation with
it, or outside of it and in opposition to, if not in conflict with it, that all
played a role in the ultimate adoption of new policies.
It is all the more important to remember that civil society actors have
proved very active since Taiwan’s democratisation period. Already involved
in accelerating Taiwan’s early democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s, the
island’s civil society activism was particularly notable under the presidency
of Ma Ying-jeou against the backdrop of concerns raised on a regular basis
regarding respect for the independence of judges, protection of the neutral-
ity and independence of the media, the social negotiation of delicate issues
such as land redevelopment and urban rezoning, and compromises with the
symbols of national sovereignty when negotiating with China, among oth-
ers. 
These and other factors led to the occupation of Taiwan’s parliament in
2014, initially by students, and then with the help of numerous civil society
organisations and the general public, for three weeks (18 March – 10 April).
The occupation was one of the most successful in the series of Occupy
movements in the world: it forced China, the KMT government, and Presi-
dent Ma to suspend a dubious trade agreement negotiated with no trans-
parency and with no proper mechanism of legislative supervision and
ratification. Since then, until the end of Ma’s presidency and ever since, no
significant negotiation has taken place between the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait. Interactions between civil society and the state apparatus can prompt
changes that sometimes run radically opposed to the government’s agenda,
without the need for power change or revolution.
Actors and values in processual change
What is processual change? It can be understood as the process by which
different actors promote change to enhance the conformity of society (or
the economy, the polity, the arts and culture, public values, or any other di-
mension of human, animal, or natural life) to their values. Each promotes,
in a way, an alternative world, inasmuch as they want to see the existing
situation change. 
This is based on a specific worldview shaped by their values. Values here
are to be understood with no relation to any conception of morality, with
neither positive nor negative connotations attributed to them by the ana-
lyst. Values here are what actors deem worthy of fighting for, for themselves
and most importantly for others. The scope of the desired change can be
limited to a specific category of the population (promoting gender equality,
rights of migrants, or same-sex marriage, etc.), or be extended to the whole
population, whether of humans, animals, or even plants: fighting against
abortion, defending animal rights, promoting renewable energy, transparent
governance, or a free press, abolition of the death penalty throughout the
world, or the denuclearisation of the planet, etc. 
Actors, values, and change: The use of social
media in the Sunflower Movement
The occupation of Taiwan’s Parliament in 2014 is a case in point. The Sun-
flower Movement unfolded in a context of deepening anxiety among Tai-
wan-identified civic groups and militants over China’s growing influence in
the world and Taiwan, especially under Ma Ying-jeou. It was also nurtured
by disillusionment with a representative democracy continuously con-
strained by the KMT’s eternal legislative majority. It led interest groups, civic
associations, and the techno-savvy younger generation of a highly technol-
ogised society that had rapidly embraced new information and communi-
cation technologies (NICTs) to an unprecedented mobilisation that halted
most government projects at once and for the rest of Ma’s second mandate.
This movement revealed a techno-based empowerment movement in the
process of maturation in post-martial law civil society in Taiwan, with new
actors and new values at the centre of the process.
Mobilisation through NICTs in popular protests has often been observed
in recent popular revolts or Occupy movements in the world. Yet the role
of NICTs in events leading to movements, as well as in the unfolding of the
movements themselves, has often been neglected. Beyond being a tool of
initial mobilisation, NICTs enable and greatly facilitate various phenomena,
such as processes of group construction (through information and inter-
subjectival construction); collective management of fear (of repression, of
parental rejection, of unknown possible legal consequences, etc.); and
re/empowerment of the self, to define what kind of militants activists are,
what kind of society they want, and how they should make it happen.
The use of NICTs is old news in Taiwan, (9) a country with one of the world’s
highest penetration rates for social media. For instance, Taiwan’s most fa-
mous Bulletin Board System, the PTT, Facebook (90.9% penetration), and
Line (over 80% penetration) are used daily, sometimes all day long, for mul-
tiple purposes (general information, common interest groups, advertising
and professional opportunities, emotional life, etc.), and across genera-
tions. (10) Taiwan is also a country where the convergence between civic ac-
tivism and computer technologies, encapsulated in the expression “civic
tech,” is dynamic and promising. This convergence was early symbolised by
the launch of an important civic tech initiative, preceding the Sunflower
Movement by two years: the gØv galaxy. Launched in October 2012 and
structured by the platform www.g0v.tw, gØv gives free and simple access
by and to netizens to full and serious information and assessment of central
and local governance in Taiwan, but is also a galaxy of hundreds of shared
projects related to civic activism – we have here a characterisation of one
of the core new actors of the movement, and of its values. gØv posits itself
as an alternative to erratic, incomplete, complex, erroneous, or malicious
information by administrations and its digestion and manipulation by tra-
ditional media or spin-doctors, but also as a tool of civic empowerment. As
a radically new actor, gØv has become one of the biggest projects of its
type in the world, and one of the earliest. With its Global Summits, where
civic initiatives have proliferated and where activists from many countries
have connected since 2014, Taiwan has posited herself as one of the world’s
beacons of civic tech and an actor in the increasingly connected techno-
sphere reaching its global stage.
It is no surprise, in such a context, that social networks and the latest ICTs
have been used to launch and manage the 2014 civic movement with re-
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9. Its earliest public form is the famous PTT, a Bulletin Board System (BBS) created in 1995, at a
time when Internet and email were still only known to a few in the world. Created 18 years before
the Sunflower Movement, PTT, still in use, remains as successful as ever, even as its interface has
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10. Taiwan Institute for Information Industry (Caituan faren zixun gongye cejinhui) is at the time of
writing working on a report on the use of NICTs in Taiwan, with a pre-report published on 1 May
2017: http://www.iii.org.tw/Press/NewsDtl.aspx?nsp_sqno=1934&fm_sqno=14 (accessed on 12
May 2017).
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markable operational success. Analysing their use in this civic movement
reveals the emergence of a generation of new actors advancing values such
as administrative transparency, Taiwanese identity, legislative overview of
government negotiations with China, protection of the island’s sovereignty,
fair treatment of information by the media, etc., through public debate en-
abled by these new tools. Interestingly, the debates facilitated by the in-
tensive use of ICTs made it possible for a wide variety of other issues to be
progressively added to the initial questions discussed by the Sunflower
Movement: Taiwan’s economy, social justice, gender equality, same sex mar-
riage, the nuclear plants, etc. 
As the use of NICTs has been manifold, a typology is needed. At least seven
types of usage can be observed: rallying and mobilising around the Parlia-
ment to express opposition to KMT politics and achieve a critical mass to
secure the survival of the movement; protecting students and demonstra-
tors by occupying public space around the legislative chamber; organising
the movement logistically – getting help, food, water, phone chargers, blan-
kets, and all the items needed for a lasting occupation; debating political,
economic, societal, and geopolitical issues; launching projects such as im-
peachment of elected officials; crowd-funding for purchasing goods and ad-
vertisements; and informing the world by producing an autonomous
discourse and denouncing “unfair media treatment,” truncated information,
biased reporting, or the propagation of false information by media outlets
that, in Taiwan, are free, but have a strong tendency to reflect political bias.
In doing so, the whole spectrum of current social media and NICTs has
been mobilised. Facebook was massively used to inform, mobilise, and or-
ganise, just as the PTT bulletin board was critical as a platform where in-
structions could be sent to everyone. Instant message providers such as
Line, WhatsApp, Messenger, Instagram, etc., were helpful in communicating
with specific persons or within ad hoc groups. Firechat, another tool for in-
stant messages, does not require 3G or 4G for its connection and hence
links telephones through Bluetooth on a local scale, which was useful in
saturated networks for informing others of a position or any important in-
formation such as perceived danger or a new event such as civic courses
by university professors supporting the movement and teaching onsite.
Google Docs, gØv.tw, Line, and Reddit have all been used to propose pro-
jects, mediatise the movement (with streaming broadcasts, online Q&A
sessions, online publication of press-feeds, and transcripts of interventions
by student leaders), and discuss issues debated during the movement.
YouTube has been mobilised to circulate short videos with transcripts in a
vast number of languages, including Turkish, Russian, Arabic, French,
Japanese, etc. Flying’V, ZecZec, and vDemocracy, all platforms of crowd-
funding, have been used or created to fund the movement and its costly
advertisements, such as the series “Democracy at 4 AM,” while Hackpad
provided a slide-share system to centralise, synchronise, and publish online
PowerPoints explaining the organisation of the movement and what vol-
unteers could do, where to go, and where to ask questions. This is just a
glimpse of the digital sophistication of a movement occupying physical
space at the same time.
A number of new actors emerged or had their existence revealed or con-
firmed by the movement: student leaders with precise knowledge of com-
plex issues pertaining to Taiwan’s economy or society; newly formed groups
advocating social progress or Taiwanese independence, and composed of a
younger generation of activists who will increasingly replace the now elderly
first generation of Formosan nationalists; or new politicians or politicians-
to-be, coming from academic or cultural careers. All placed themselves ex-
plicitly outside traditional parties, including the one most inclined to sup-
port their ideas, the DPP, with which they officially maintained a respectful
distance. In this process, a new and potentially extremely powerful actor
may have emerged unnoticed: the collective intelligence composed of thou-
sands of interconnected activists. 
Cases studied in this special issue
Processual Change in Taiwan discusses four case studies analysing as I did
above the role played by actors in processes of change in Taiwan: the defi-
nition of the contested nation in tourist souvenirs by private operators ad-
dressing tourists’ needs (Adina Zemanek), how netizens have tried to
prevent policies by local governments regarding the invention of a cultural
tradition with which they did not identify (Fiorella Bourgeois), the question
of transitional justice and how the authoritarian past is discussed today in
Taiwan by a variety of actors such as victims, associations, and the state
(Vladimir Stolojan), and how a powerful business magnate and civil society
militants confronted each other over the question of media independence
in a context of China’s growing influence over Taiwan under the Presidency
of Ma (Lin and Lee).
In her article, Adina Zemanek looks at present-day tourist souvenirs that
are shaping the perception of Taiwan’s national identity by representing it
graphically as an individual entity, separate from China. Zemanek shows
how designers of postcards, stickers, and other souvenirs capture Taiwan’s
specific history, geography, and daily life to generate a notion of community.
While public diplomacy may have depicted Taiwan, in the recent past, as
the preserver of traditional Chinese culture, placing it in China’s shadow, the
actors discussed in this article put forward Taiwan’s everyday sights and
unique arrangement of local foundations and outside influences that have
shaped its history. It is time, the author argues, to have a close look at these
cultural productions. By endorsing these diverse heritages, including
Japanese influences, which were usually eschewed by official discourse in
the past, they contribute to establishing historical continuity and memorial
coherence. The decisions over branding Taiwanese identity in these souvenirs
are taken by grassroots agents, and they reflect their internalisation of Tai-
wanese identity.
Fiorella Bourgeois’ article shows again that any change is multidimen-
sional. The question addressed here is the destruction of two Hakka kilns
dating back to the mid-twentieth century and the construction of typical
Hakka village houses (tulou) that are found in China but not in Taiwan. The
article analyses the emergence of voices from civil society, in some cases
possibly expressed online for the very first time. Through social media, in-
dividual voices coalesce into a form of public collective voice, quite possibly
with no organisation behind them. They disrupt the usually too-easy process
of decision-making by elected local officials unused to being challenged by
electors, especially through NITCs. Actors are here clearly identified and
posed face-to-face (netizens against officials), while the underlying values
are once again administrative transparency, adequate spending, protection
of Taiwan’s identity, and citizen watch.
A third article, written by Vladimir Stolojan, analyses social memory, an-
other kind of collective discourse elaborated and maintained at the level of
the individual. The history of transitional justice in Taiwan starts with the
lifting of martial law in 1987, with the constitution of associations of former
political prisoners, and the movement calling for the rehabilitation of the
victims of the February 28 massacre – the 1947 massacre of the Taiwanese
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elite and militants opposing the KMT’s nepotism and incompetence. They
obtained acknowledgment of the massacre and financial compensation in
a movement that later extended to the subsequent White Terror and its vic-
tims. Stolojan points out the length of the road of transitional justice: the
adoption of a legal framework dealing with the tragedy of the victims was
not the end of their fight, as they had to wait several more years to see
their voices more deeply acknowledged in Taiwanese society and the state
to better understand the meaning of their request and later modify the in-
stitutional discourse in museums. Change is here gradual, in a negotiated
process between associations of victims, the state apparatus, and the col-
lective memory of the Taiwanese populace.
The last article, written by Lin Lihyun and Lee Chun-Yi, introduces trans-
boundary actors in the form of a businessman who earned a fortune in China
and came back to Taiwan with the intention of purchasing media outlets
and influencing Taiwanese to look more positively at China – with the ex-
pectation that his efforts would be appreciated in China and allow further
development of his businesses there. The authors examine the relations be-
tween emerging media capital and the Taiwanese government in the context
of a growing “China factor.” Although the model of ”patron-client relation-
ship” is useful to describe the relationship between the government and the
media within one nation-state, in the case of cross-border capital flow, busi-
ness groups may be involved in rent-seeking activities in different countries
and have to deal with different and even rival governments. In the case of
China-Taiwan relations, economic activities across the Strait have always
been entangled with political intentions. The article presents the case of Tai-
wan’s Want Want group, which gained immense interests in China and strong
ties with the Beijing government after entering the Chinese market as early
as the 1980s. It was not until 2008 that Want Want returned to Taiwan to
purchase a media outlet. With its major business interests in China, Want
Want openly supported the official ideology of the Chinese Communist Party,
and its attempts to ignore the legal framework and political values of Tai-
wanese society provoked fierce debate between the conglomerate, the state,
and civil society radically opposed to the deal.
Conclusion
Actors establish agendas for themselves and for society along the lines
of changes they are determined to fight for. If it is relatively easy to 
discribe changes from an institutional point of view (for instance, which
law was amended by a legislature, with which consequences), it is more
complicated to analyse changes when we focus on the process and not
on the result. In each case study above, whether a businessman, civic
tech groups, private publishing companies, the state, elected officials,
China, victims of political persecution, or local residents in Taiwan, com-
peting actors, old and new, as well as the values they defend and the
channel of influence they use, are analysed to show how change is envi-
sioned, programmed, and engineered. Changes studied here are actively
engineered either by competition, conflict, or cooperation among actors
in ever-changing situations.
The weakness of civil society is a consequence and a sign of dictatorship,
while totalitarian political structures try to eradicate it in their attempt to
establish a direct link between the Party and every citizen and to avoid the
emergence of intermediary bodies they do not control. Conversely, it is dif-
ficult to imagine a democratisation process without the incremental con-
stitution of a civil society. Whether analysing Chinese or Taiwanese social
or political transformation, focusing on actors and their values can be a way
of revealing the multiplicity of stakeholders to be identified and studied in
order to understand more comprehensively the processes of elaboration or
reinforcement of such a civil society. 
Projects currently being turned into laws by the legislature and into poli-
cies by the executive branch of government in Taiwan will likely lead to
important changes at both the practical and symbolic levels. They have
been widely discussed for years by civil society, the upsurge of which dur-
ing the 2014 Sunflower Movement further destabilised the KMT and
helped bring the opposition to power in 2016. Yet, after the inauguration
of a new government and a new legislature endorsing most of these re-
forms, each reform or project still met with resistance, debate, and some-
times new protest in the streets of Taipei. This course of events illustrates
the vitality of Taiwanese civil society, even though, unlike the large popular
protests of the Ma Ying-jeou era, recent protests appear sectional – in
other words, led by those who directly have something to lose in reforms
– rather than pulling in all of society as the Sunflower Movement did in
March-April 2014.
z Stéphane Corcuff is Director of the CEFC Taipei
(scorcuff@cefc.com.hk).
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